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Technocracy often holds out the promise of rational, professional, and politically 
disinterested decision-making particularly in economic planning and management. 
Yet states and regimes frequently turn to technocracy not just to obtain expert 
inputs and calculated outcomes but to embed the exercise of power in many agendas, 
policies, and programs.  Thus, technocracy operates as an appendage of politically 
constructed structures and configurations of power, and highly placed technocrats 
cannot be mere backroom experts who supply disinterested rational-technical solu-
tions in economic planning, resource allocation, and social distribution since they 
are engaged in inherently political exercises.  Using examples of technocratic inter-
ventions in a variety of developing countries, this article traces the trajectories of 
technocracy that were marked by conflict, especially in conditions of rapid social 
transformation, severe economic restructuring, or political crises when the techno-
cratic was unavoidably political.
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I am not a politician. . . . I am a technocrat and believe in technocracy,
and technicians are politically neutral.
(Raúl Prebisch cited in Dosman 2008)
With social thought turning so rapidly into attempted social engineering,
a high incidence of failed experiments is the price that is often paid for
the influence intellectuals wield.
(Hirschman 1979, 86–87)
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Technocracy, signifying the use of technocrats in economic decision-making (rather than 
the more precise but rarely encountered rule by technocrats), has had a curiously troubled 
relationship with politics.  At first glance that seems unlikely.  On the one hand, politics, 
in the shape of states and regimes, needs technocracy for complex policy formulation 
that is fortified and legitimized by expert knowledge, methodical applications, and rea-
soned expectations.  Technocracy, on the other hand, needs politics, that is, the sanction 
of power, to insulate it from pressure and interference that would prevent technocrats 
from being deployed or heeded “without fear or favor” as the old cliché goes.
In reality their apparently symbiotic relationship contains a latent conflict.  The 
conflict is readily seen in certain forms.  Sometimes seemingly technical recommenda-
tions may be rejected and the technocrats associated with them ejected from their posi-
tions for running afoul of the powers that in principle insulate them from interference. 
At other times, technocrats find themselves arraigned against vested interests that cir-
cumvent or sabotage technocratic forms of governance.  Or else, popular resentment 
against apparently rational policies may erupt into anti-regime protests that are put down 
by repressive measures.  Yet, the conflict lies deeper.  Politics depends on technocracy 
for expert inputs and calculated outcomes in order to embed the exercise of state power 
in many kinds of agendas, policies, decisions, and programs.  Thus, any functioning tech-
nocracy operates as an appendage of politically constructed structures, institutions, and 
configurations of power.  At certain levels of work and in circumscribed situations, socio-
economic problems may require no more than technical solutions.  Beyond that, it is 
illusory to conceive of highly placed policy-making technocrats as backroom boys (and 
girls) whose task is to prepare disinterested rational-technical solutions to problems of 
economic planning, resource allocation, and social distribution, each of which is inherently 
a political matter.1)  The potential for conflict is especially high when technocracy is 
inserted into policy-making and technocrats emerge as an identifiable force under critical 
circumstances—during periods of rapid social transformation, in conditions of severe 
economic restructuring, or at moments of political crises—when the technocratic is 
unavoidably political.
This article traces a post-World War II trajectory of tension and conflict between 
technocracy and politics, mostly in what used to be called the “underdeveloped” world. 
Within that trajectory the relationship between technocracy and politics had several 
1) “Clearly, some expertise is necessary to operate a statistical office or build a bridge.  It is not so 
obvious, however, that one need be familiar with econometrics to be able to discuss economic 
policy or be an engineer in order to judge the merits of a new airport site” (Centeno 1993, 318). 
One need not agree wholly with the examples to see the point of the argument.
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dimensions.  These included changes in the projects of economic transformation—from 
modernization and development to debt and crisis management to economic stabilization 
and structural adjustment, and the neoliberal reconfiguration of the global economy—for 
which technocracy was co-opted.  As such, technocrats themselves assumed different 
roles, being planners, implementers, managers, brokers, and intermediaries.  The condi-
tions of technocratic deployment and the hopes of their outcomes changed, too: visions 
of postcolonial development collapsed under structural adjustment while state interven-
tion was reduced to neoliberal good governance.  At the beginning of the trajectory was 
an issue that preoccupied regimes and technocrats: how should technocratic decision- and 
policy-making be insulated from vested interests or popular pressure?  At its end has 
arisen “technocratization” or fusion of technocracy and politics as a way to overcome the 
conflicts that made each of them the bane of the other.  The article contends that the 
narrowing potential for relatively autonomous development and a resurgence of populist 
forms of dissent in the former Third World suggest that just as politics can no longer 
depend on technocratic solutions, technocracy is far from resolving its political problems.
Crises of Modernization and Development
Under the influence of “applied modernization theory,” technocracy held considerable 
appeal for most postcolonial governments that (even or especially when they were moved 
by nationalist impulses) were searching for ways to leave behind their “techno-economic 
backwardness” that produced an “unholy trinity of ignorance, poverty and disease” 
(Mkandawire 2005, 13).  While theoretical debates raged among the political and intel-
lectual circles over which developmental paths were economically ideal, politically fea-
sible, or socially desirable, postcolonial regimes often reserved, or were advised to 
reserve, a special role in socio-economic planning for technocrats.  These were “one 
sub-group of bureaucrats that possesses specialized knowledge” (Centeno 1993, 310) 
whose training, expertise, and professionalism were thought to have equipped them with 
the modern values, rational attitudes, and technical methods needed to modernize their 
traditional societies.  For example, an international consultancy report on improving 
“development administration,”2) a forerunner of technocracy, reasoned that:
2) The functions of “modern development administration” included “innovation, experimentation, 
active intervention in the economy, major involvement with clients, building new capacities, and 
conflict-management activities” but these functions “cannot be accommodated within the norms of 
classical Western models of administration” (Esman 1974, 16).
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Modern government depends increasingly upon modern technology for national security, for the 
conduct of its own developmental and recurrent operations, and for the performance of its regula-
tory and control functions.  The proficiency and knowledge of its professional and sub-professional 
classes therefore define the ultimate limits of its technical capabilities. . . . Because of the rapid 
obsolescence of professional and technical knowledge in certain fields, in fact, it may be necessary 
to devote disproportionate emphasis to those services where the rate of change is greatest. 
 (Montgomery and Esman 1966, 14)
Indeed, even after modernization theory qua theory had been discarded, a development 
paradigm it spawned continued to pose issues of development as technical matters to be 
planned and managed in top-down fashion by professional personnel.  To that extent, 
even when an “unsuccessful top-down approach, which had dominated the development 
industry until about 1990” was modified with ideas of decentralization and good gover-
nance, its technocratic discourse, focused on technical and instrumental solutions, only 
“directed the technocratic IDAs [International Development Agencies] back to where 
they started—in the structural crisis of development” (Bryld 2000, 700, 704).3)
It was not just hopes of development that made technocracy appealing.  In some 
situations, the failure of development brought an urgent and purposeful deployment of 
technocrats when “the permanence, the technical skills, and the anonymity of [techno-
crats] ma[d]e them appear the possible receivers for otherwise bankrupt regimes.”4)  The 
insertion of technocracy into economic policy-making and management in this manner 
occurred most dramatically in “post-crisis economies.”5)  Some of those were under-
developed economies, others post-Soviet Union nations undertaking a transition to 
capitalism.  Those countries greatly differed socially, economically, and politically.  In 
common, however, their regimes acquired a partially technocratic character by deploying 
technocrats in high-level economic policy-making as a response to crisis.  At moments 
of systemic crisis, rule by experts equipped with “technocracy’s apparent emphasis on 
order, rationality and apolitical criteria” could be alluring (Centeno 1993, 324).  During 
the Cold War period, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the turn to technoc-
racy joined social experiments in modernization or transformation to political attempts 
at crisis management.  Thereby, rulers and technocrats hoped that capitalist rationaliza-
3) Bryld (2000, 702–703) made an important distinction between political and technical interpretations 
of concepts such as decentralization and governance when he argued that the IDAs “engage in a 
technical decentralization process . . . to achieve good governance and thus promote development,” 
using a “technical instrument . . . to reach what is necessarily a political goal.”
4) Peters (1979, 342); here, “technocrats” has been substituted for “bureaucrats” in the original text.
5) Technocrats, of course, had a different, extremely successful record elsewhere, in Japan and the 
newly-industrializing economies of East Asia a discussion of which is given in a later section of this 
article.
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tion undertaken by mostly authoritarian regimes would be the answer to the failures of 
development that spawned radical popular mobilization.
The two reasons for the emergence of technocracy, discussed above, converged in 
a lasting politics of technocratic policy-making although the fads and phraseology of 
dominant economic doctrine changed with time and situation.  Certainly technocracy and 
the rise of technocrats as an identifiable force in the respective economies and political 
systems of those countries could not have been apolitical.  They were seen in such 
extraordinarily politicized situations as Thailand after Sarit’s imposition of martial law in 
1958, Indonesia in the wake of Soeharto’s 1965 gestapu, Chile following Pinochet’s over-
throw of Allende in 1973,6) Ghana subsequent to military takeover in 1981, and any of a 
number of Eastern European or Baltic states that broke from Soviet domination after 
1989.  It seemed that a technical development model could be applied to less-than-
modern societies and a “coherent, practical and authoritarian ideology or model of 
moderni zation” could be recommended to societies and political systems in crisis:
The technocratic model of modernization, as a highly functional strategy of government, borne into 
an appropriate crisis by a mission-minded team of technocrats and imposed by the military and 
supported by its beneficiaries, may recommend itself to like-minded and organized elites confront-
ing similar crises.  (MacDougall 1976, 1168)7)
Under Soeharto’s New Order which inspired this “technocratic model,”
economists-technocrats, as non-party, professionally-trained experts, have replaced politicians in 
policy making posts, most visibly as a team of academics that moved into government posts later-
ally, from the University of Indonesia. . . . In a bureaucratic state, these technocrats have functioned 
as policy innovators, as courtiers of foreign investment, and as relatively systematic administrators. 
They have provided a repressive military regime with a progressive civilian image and initiated 
their military patrons into the mysteries of their science. (ibid., 1166)8)
6) For Chile which has had a longer technocratic tradition than the other countries listed here, Silva 
(1994, 282) has suggested that technocracy emerged in a post-World War I crisis of oligarchic order 
which “created a very propitious climate for the adoption of so-called ‘technical and apolitical’ poli-
cies” and allowed a public technocracy to act as a “moderating mediator” between competing socio-
political forces.
7) MacDougall’s is the most insistently approving of three articles in the same issue of Asian Survey 
(Vol. 16, No. 12, 1976) to assess, essentially to praise, “the contributions of technocrats to develop-
ment” in Southeast Asia.
8) So arcane were the “mysteries of their science” that MacDougall was lost for a proper name for the 
“scientists” on whom he conferred a litany of titles; to wit, “economists-technocrats,” “profession-
ally trained experts,” “professor-economists,” “practical modernizers,” “economic modernizers,” 
“economists,” “production-minded bureaucra[ts],” “New Order modernizers,” and “primarily 
Western-educated economists” (MacDougall 1976, 1166, 1172, 1176, 1181).
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The model presupposed the benign intent of any “like-minded elite” and the pro-
gressive stances of its “mission-minded team of technocrats.”  Even so, those who opted 
for technocracy had to insulate the technocrats drafted for high-level policy-making.  Well 
might the leading technocrats—the “Berkeley Mafia,” the “Chicago Boys,” and Marcos’s 
“pillar,”9) to take three notable examples—have been cast as “providing a repressive 
military regime with a progressive civilian image.”  But they could hardly live down their 
collective reputations as the expert collaborators of military dictatorships, the designers 
and implementers of harshly imposed programs of economic restructuring, reductions 
in social spending, and deflationary policies.10)  In Chile, some programs to combat 
extreme poverty were undertaken to give a populist tint to neoliberal economic restruc-
turing (Huneeus 2000, 498).  Of Marcos’s technocratic pillar, the World Bank’s Ascher 
Memorandum candidly observed in 1980 that:
There is no evidence that the economic expansion of the first five years of martial law has created 
a favorable image of the technocrats that could offset the blame they have incurred for the sluggish 
growth, higher inflation, and unemployment of the last few years.11)
Again a frank précis of a similar situation of technocrats operating in an environment of 
“low politics” created by an authoritarian regime was made by another World Bank 
report, this time on Ghana after more than one military coup:
The military character of the Government made it possible to implement unpopular measures while 
depressing [sic] dissent.  Policy issues have not been openly debated, and freedom of information 
and publishing rights are restricted.  However, Ghana’s military leaders have given considerable 
decision making latitude on economic matters to the highly qualified technical team which was 
charged with managing the economic reform. (Nooter and Stacy 1990, cited in Moore 1995, 21)12)
Likewise, Thailand’s administration of a World Bank structural adjustment loan 
following an economic crisis in the early 1980s was successful, it has been argued, 
because Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda placed “specialist economic technocrats” in 
9) Bello, O’Connor and Broad (1982, 185) characterized Filipino technocrats as forming one of the 
“three pillars” of the Marcos dictatorship, the other two being the army and the “cronies.”
10) As MacIntyre and Jayasuriya (1992, 3–4) put it succinctly, “Economic adjustment (particularly in 
inclement global conditions) is a politically painful process, for in addition to creating glittering new 
benefits for some it also creates heavy costs for others.  As much as an economic process, structural 
reform is a political process creating new winners and losers.  The distribution of the costs and 
benefits of adjustment measures is central to an understanding of economic reform.”
11) Cited in Bello, O’Connor, and Broad (1982, 193).
12) Moore (1995) added (in his endnote, p.114), “One assumes that the ‘highly qualified team’ was a 
World Bank team, of course.”
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key positions and gave them “protection from the pressures and protests of those groups 
opposed to the changes” the technocrats introduced (Anek 1992, 47).13)  Thus, the apo-
litical efficacy for which the technocrats were supposedly valued and lauded could only 
be attained by firm demonstrations of “political will” that insulated their technocratic 
deliberations, directions, and decisions from public debate, “immunized” political opposi-
tion to their programs, and repressed popular resentments (Bello, O’Connor, and Broad 
1982; Silva 1991).
Moreover, the top technocrats, not having their own political base, owed their priv-
ileged positions to the patronage of regime leaders14) who typically drafted them from other 
than the normal ranks of the state’s administrative machinery to serve in select agencies. 
Parachuted from relative obscurity into policy-making prominence, those technocrats 
could only operate against certain powerful vested interests, where necessary, if they were 
insulated from the obstructive actions of the latter.  In the Philippines, the technocrats 
responsible for economic reform were often in conflict with the Marcos cronies, with the 
former enjoying the additional approval of the World Bank, but with the latter being 
regarded by the dictatorship as its more reliable “pillar” (Bello, O’Connor, and Broad 
1982, 190–193).  Technocracy in Latin America, too, was dependent on, rather than anti-
thetical to, patrimonial and caudillo authority although “the latter rests on presumed per-
sonal qualities rather than the possession of specialized knowledge” (Teichman 2004, 25).
The converse was true, too: those who failed to persuade the patron or fall in with 
his intentions, or opposed his plans would not last in their positions.  If one were to be 
cynical, the relatively cheap dispensability of technocrats was one of technocracy’s attrac-
tions to regimes and leaders from whom, alas, there could be no insulation.  As Shiraishi 
in this volume shows, the Indonesian technocrats, “cohesive in their adherence to the 
three principles of balanced budget, open capital account, and pegged exchange rate 
system,” were effective for three decades when they functioned as Soeharto’s “right arm 
in formulating and executing national development policies.”  However, when in response 
to the financial crisis of 1997–98 the technocrats urged Soeharto to call in the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and introduce reform measures, their move backfired 
because they had lost Soeharto’s confidence and was denied access to him.  In Thailand, 
13) Anek (1992, 32) stressed “Prem’s ability to insulate economic officials from the pressures of various 
opposing groups by building coalitional links to countervailing groups and institutions.”
14) Prominent regime leaders, each the leader of a coup d’etat, were Sarit (in Thailand), Soeharto, 
Pinochet, and Marcos.  MacDougall (1976, 1167) called Soeharto the “prize student” who profited 
from the “tutelage” of his “presidential counselors”; thus was Soeharto elevated beyond the “poli-
ticians” who were dismissed by the “counselors” as more or less “grossly incompetent,” “eco-
nomically irrational,” unproductively-inclined, indecisive, and impractical (ibid., 1179).
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Thaksin Shinawatra dismissed the “inflexible” head of the Bank of Thailand and filled 
key planning and financial posts with Thaksin’s own “outsider” advisers, as Pasuk and 
Baker recount in this volume.  Mahathir Mohamad, who sharply disapproved of their 
monetary and fiscal responses to the 1997 financial crisis, forced the resignations of the 
Governor and Deputy Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia just days before he sacked 
Anwar Ibrahim, Deputy Prime Minister and concurrently the Minister of Finance, on 
September 2, 1998 (Khoo 2003).15)
The need for insulation could arise from a different source.  A technocratic view of 
governance assumed that “all social actors can be modeled in certain predictable ways” 
and since “specialization [confers] on experts wisdom, self restraint, and a sense of social 
justice,” technocrats “should be provided with sufficient political insulation to be able to 
plan, implement and monitor state programmes” (Bangura 1994, 56).16)  Or, if one pre-
ferred, there was link between a “technocratic mentality” and “authoritarian, exclusion-
ary politics, resistant to both compromise and the incorporation of contrary viewpoints” 
(Teichman 2004, 25).17)  In any case, just how technically superior their ideas and policies 
were compared to contrary viewpoints could not be determined, simply because of “the 
disappearance from the political scene of forces whose ideological predispositions favored 
the radical redistribution of wealth and resources” (Hadiz 1997, 63).
Alternatively, it was unnecessary to presuppose that technocrats had to accept an 
“inherent desirability of authoritarian political structures” to see that their “technically 
rational” pursuit of economic stabilization and growth at “virtually any social or political 
cost” led to legitimating authoritarian rule (Kaufman 1979, 190).  The technocrats were 
not necessarily reluctant practitioners of received economic doctrines that set or limited 
the directions of their policies and strategies.  There was a self-deluding aspect to the 
basic technocratic conviction that being pragmatic was being non-ideological.  On the 
contrary,
15) And this, in Malaysia where technocracy was part of an established and loyal civil service!  Bank 
Negara enjoys “a reasonable degree of operational autonomy” but is not independent; it accepts 
that its functions are tied to “broader goals”—economic growth, high level of employment, price 
stability, reasonable balance in the country’s international payments position, eradication of poverty, 
and restructuring society (Hamilton-Hart 2008, 53).  By law, the King appoints the Governor while 
the Minister of Finance appoints the Deputy Governor.  In practice, the Prime Minister decides.
16) One could add a “technocratic view of the state . . . as a rational actor with a narrow focus on how 
to improve effectiveness and efficiency.  Little attention is paid to non-economic factors, and the 
political aspects are overlooked.  Thus, the complex political, social and cultural landscape in which 
the state operates is grossly oversimplified” (Bryld 2000, 703).
17) Still, technocrats may not always have their way.  Shiraishi (in this volume) shows how the 
technocrat- economists favored by Soeharto had to contend with the “engineers” whose rival vision 
of development was infused with economic nationalism.
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In imposing the domination by an instrumental rationale and scientific method, technocracies are 
similar to theocratic regimes or states that have explicit, dominant political ideologies.  In all these 
cases, legitimacy comes . . . from adherence to the dictates of a “book.”  Whether that document 
contains the word of god, a theory of history, or the econometric functions that describe equilibria, 
those best able to interpret its message and implement its laws cannot take opposition or popular 
participation into account. (Centeno 1993, 313)
Where monetarism ruled alongside the military in “a climate of total triumphalism” to 
“establish the rules of neoliberalism in all spheres of society” (Silva 1991, 395):
[t]he Chicago boys presented themselves as the bearers of an absolute knowledge of modern 
economic science, thereby dismissing the existence of economic alternatives.  All possible criticism 
of the economic model was rejected by portraying it as the product either of ignorance or the covert 
promotion of particular interests. (ibid., 394)
Despite the insulation, patronage, and absence of rival paradigms, the technocratic 
model did not establish an unambiguously salutary record of economic development in 
the two situations where the model was most hailed.  New Order Indonesia hardly vin-
dicated “technocratic optimism,” as was discovered by a group of young intellectuals 
collected around the Bandung-based weekly, Mahasiswa Indonesia.  They scorned 
Sukarno and the existing political parties.  Having no mass base, they looked to the 
military for modernizing reforms and to the Western capitalist countries for political and 
financial support.  Later, these
outspoken champions of a technocratic style of “development” [were] distressed to discover that 
“development” exacerbated rather than reduced corruption, widened the gap between rich and 
poor, and greatly increased Indonesia’s external dependency . . . [while] opening the country’s 
doors to Western culture turned out to have more disintegrative than modernizing effects on 
Indonesian society.18)
Nor was the lesson from Pinochet’s Chile—the need “to create highly cohesive techno-
cratic policymaking teams with relatively high degrees of insulation from social forces” 
(Silva 1996, 2)—so readily worthy of replication:
Under military rule, boom and bust cycles and mounting social costs characterized Chile’s lurching 
efforts to reorganize the economy radically.  A short, gradual programme of economic stabilization 
18) This summary of the change in sentiment among the Mahasiswa Indonesia intellectuals comes from 
a review of Francois Raillon’s book on this group which the initially “still insecure Suharto clique 
found [to be] useful allies, since they provided an attractive ideological rationale for a regime that 
had none of its own and was desperately concerned to win respectability in Western eyes”  (Anderson 
1986, 541).
Khoo Boo Teik424
and restructuring after the overthrow of Salvador Allende was followed by draconian, ideologically 
rigid neoliberal policies, uneven economic recovery, and a brief spurt of rapid economic growth 
fueled by financial speculation that ended in Chile’s worst economic decline since the Great Depres-
sion. (ibid., 1)
Intermediation and Domination
The mode and circumstance of crisis management frequently left the technocrats casti-
gated as agents of foreign domination and penetration.  It was not so much that many 
influential technocrats had been trained abroad, in the University of California, Berkeley, 
and University of Chicago, most famously or notoriously.19)  Shiraishi in this volume sug-
gests that the “Berkeley Mafia” could just as well have been called the “UI-UGM Mafia,” 
given their initial training and later appointments, as students and then lecturers, with 
Universitas Indonesia and Universitas Gadjah Mada, the two leading universities of 
 Indonesia.  For Pinochet’s leading technocrats, besides, Santiago came before Chicago 
(Silva 1991, 390–391), and the Universidad Católica de Chile before Milton Friedman’s 
Department of Economics (Huneeus 2000, 473–477).  More to the point, those techno-
crats were the practitioners of crash programs of economic restructuring and stabiliza-
tion, pro-market reform, structural adjustment, and integration or re-integration with the 
global capitalist system.
Such programs, seemingly the more legitimate the more they claimed to replace 
failed domestic initiatives, were typically implemented with the backing, under the over-
sight, and at the demand of foreign creditors, the IMF, and the World Bank.  In general, 
the regimes’ hopes of capital inflows, promises of foreign aid, and expectations of eco-
nomic improvement had to be weighed against external pressures to dismantle the pre-
viously nationalist, socialist, or populist policy molds of crisis economies, and to remake 
them in the image of western market-based systems.  To restructure debt-ridden econ-
omies according to structural adjustment conditionalities, for instance, technocrats with 
the concurrence of their rulers had to impose deflationary policies.  But, over and over 
again, the consequence was typical: internal sacrifices were imposed on vulnerable sec-
tions of society, but the “lender of last resort” never demanded “haircuts” of foreign 
creditors who had made reckless loans.
Obviously no lovers of their displaced regimes, the leading technocrats “were more 
than simply the principal architects of economic policy: they were the intellectual brokers 
19) For an impressive list of the foreign university affiliation of the economic team of Patricio Aylwin 
in Chile, see Silva (1991, 407, Table 2).
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between their governments and international capital, and symbols of the government’s 
determination to rationalize its rule in terms of economic objectives” (Kaufman 1979, 
189).  For example, an observer, who conferred an ancient pedigree on Thai technocracy 
by characterizing Siam’s absolute monarchs as technocrats for having introduced modern-
izing reforms, wrote of the World Bank and Thai technocrats as kindred spirits in restruc-
turing administrative, financial, and planning systems:
The World Bank’s implicit development ideology coincided with the classical conservatism of the 
technocrats and the two groups tended to bring to bear similar viewpoints when considering mon-
etary or fiscal policy issues.  Thailand joined the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 
1949, and each major loan negotiation or mission from the Bank and the Annual Consultation with 
the Fund tended to strengthen the technocrats’ influence in the government. (Stifel 1976, 1193)
A different view which suggested that Thai technocracy emerged after the World Bank’s 
economic survey of Thailand 1957–58 more critically held technocracy to be an accessory 
to the far from technical act of mapping and launching Thailand’s development paths in 
the aftermath of Sarit’s imposition of martial law in October 1958:
[t]he resultant World Bank programme . . . acted as a catalyst that conjoined the new political 
regime and a new development direction for Thailand, activating a combined force of Sarit’s abso-
lutist power, American imperialist wherewithal, and the technocratic strategic planning and tech-
nical know-how in the momentous transformation of Thai economy and society. (Kasian 2004, 30)
Perhaps there was little alternative.  Like the rest of Southeast Asia, Thailand was in 
such dire need of technocratic skills given “the post-war economic disorder, decoloni-
zation, and a new responsibility for development” that a pioneering “small group of 
technocrats, usually trained in Europe . . . quickly gained considerable power because of 
the rarity of their skills” (Pasuk and Baker in this volume).  And although the “close 
cooperation among a small group . . . [was] later mythologized” (ibid.), the Thai techno-
cratic cadre that was created from the 1960s was
engaged mostly in the technical management of the economy—infrastructure planning, and tight 
macro management under a fixed exchange rate regime.  The main direction of policy was laid 
down by the military rulers under the influence of the World Bank, and adjusted in practice by 
business lobbies.  Technocrats administered policy, but in this era had only a limited role in making 
policy. (Pasuk and Baker 2000, 20)20)
20) Pasuk (1992, 26) concluded that over several post-war decades, Thai technocrats (and foreign advis-
ers) helped “forge the tools [of policy reform] and . . . wield them” but “they did not decide when, 
where, and how they should be brought into action.”
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Being the intermediaries between the national and the global, so to speak, techno-
crats were most valuable in symbolic, ideological, and practical terms.  Through them 
“cooperation with international business [and] a fuller integration into the world econ-
omy” was attained (Kaufman 1979, 190).  The technocrats displayed “a strictly secular 
willingness to adopt the prevailing tenets of international economic orthodoxy . . . a 
 different, but no less ideologically bounded, set of intellectual parameters within which 
the technocrats could then ‘pragmatically’ pursue the requirements of stabilization and 
expansion” (ibid.).  Thus, in the “still weak and chaotic” Indonesia after Soeharto’s 
 seizure of power, the Widjojo Nitisastro-led team of technocrats showed that the way to 
obtain necessary external resources was to design policies that found favor with global 
capi talism: the termination of “confrontation” with Malaysia, abolition of price controls, 
return of nationalized enterprises to former owners, passage of a liberal foreign invest-
ment law, rationalization of banking and interest rates, and end of multiple exchange rates 
 (Anderson 1983, 488–489).  Up to the mid-1970s, the Indonesian technocrats “adhered 
to the type of free-market, open-door economics advocated by Western liberal economic 
orthodoxy in general and the IMF, the World Bank . . . and the Inter-Governmental Group 
on Indonesia in particular” (Robison 1986, 110).  But the technocrats really derived their 
power from their role as “managers of the process of debt renegotiation, and as authors 
of policies designed to allow international capital access to Indonesia” (ibid.).
It was power that rose and fell with the need for international capital investment, 
loans, and aid (ibid., 111).  Often the technocrats’ policies and programs did not fail, at 
least not initially, and not least because “rewards” of aid and capital flows to the regime 
they served replaced the external investor-creditor-state hostility to the supplanted 
regime and even sabotage of its economy (as had happened to “anti-imperialist” Indone-
sia and “socialist” Chile before their respective military coups).  With relative success, 
the technocrats gained more than ideological benediction from their close associations 
with international educational and financial institutions.  Thus, by the early 1990s, when 
Latin American technocrats defined “the new [that is, neoliberal] policy paradigms,” they 
could count on the support and approval of a “continental network of Harvard, Chicago, 
and Stanford grads . . . atop businesses and ministries spreading the new market mind-
set” (Business Week, June 15, 1992, 51, cited in Centeno 1994, 24).  The existence of an 
“international network linking IMF analysts, private investors, bank officials, and govern-
ment technocrats was not the figment of the conspiratorial imagination of those who 
sought to understand the new wave”; “[n]ot only creditors and multilateral agencies, 
lecturers and seminar presenters, media pundits and intellectual authorities, but even 
the ex-roommates of the new elites approved the new policies” (Centeno 1994, 24).
At different points in the post-World War II development of the global economy, 
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therefore, technocrats found themselves managing a range of economic, fiscal, debt, and 
monetary crises in various countries and regions.  Whatever they did, and whatever the 
purposes they thought they were serving, they came to be the standard bearers of the 
World Bank’s development orthodoxy, Milton Friedman’s monetarism, Jeffrey Sachs’s 
“shock therapy,” the IMF’s “good governance” strictures for structural adjustment,21) 
and the Washington Consensus of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.
Rare Reproduction
Purveyors of instrumental approaches, technocrats would seem to be little more than 
the instruments of others.  Such was not always the case.  Technocracy was not neces-
sarily pre-empted from coming into its own, minimally to display more assertive forms 
of conduct than those discussed above.  During the early and hopeful days of decoloni-
zation, “moral incentives” moved many would-be bureaucrats and technocrats: “the 
self-confidence, enthusiasm, and commitment that were so evident in African bureaucra-
cies . . . were contagious, as reflected in many African students who anxiously rushed 
home after graduation to participate in the exhilarating projects of nation-building” 
 (Mkandawire 2005, 16).  Offering a less skeptical view of the predispositions of techno-
crats, relevant to the point being made here, Turner noted that in early 1970s’ Nigeria:
Individual technocrats, by virtue of their technical training, and in some cases, experience in 
industry, are accustomed to rational, impersonal and universal criteria for making decisions and 
for assessing their own accomplishments.  Professional standing, and therefore job mobility, 
depends on getting results which in turn depends on co-operation with other technocrats.  Tech-
nocrats are relatively uncorrupt, not because they possess special moral qualities, but because 
their function is to develop and provide local technical and executive capabilities and reduce 
 dependence on foreign resources. (Turner 1976, 69)22)
Turner’s was a balanced depiction of Nigerian technocrats: they “stood” (in relation to 
compradors and middlemen within the civil service, and the foreign oil interests they 
serviced) according to where they “sat” (within structures of state power in the early 
1970s).  More generally, Turner’s portrayal insightfully hinted how differently placed 
21) Dijkstra (1996), evaluating “foreign influence on economic policies” under the Chamorro regime in 
Nicaragua, stressed that the implementation of structural adjustment measures could just as much 
be a “consequence of ideology rather than impartial technical advice,” and hence not technocratic 
as such.
22) For what it is worth today, it might be noted that Turner’s depiction was badly misrepresented in 
Droucopoulos and Henley (1977).
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technocrats might orient their policy-making vis-à-vis foreign interests if or when they 
were imbued with impulses of economic nationalism.  Roughly akin to the Nigerian situ-
ation, Indonesian technocrats in the mid-1970s were engaged in a protracted conflict with 
“various appanage holders” (Robison 1990, 110) who controlled Pertamina, the state oil 
company.  The technocrats were especially opposed to the “financially unsound schemes 
. . . regardless of established priorities and acceptable costs” launched by Ibnu Sutowo, 
one time head of Pertamina (Milne 1982, 407).  In Malaysia, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 
the Chairman of Petronas, the national oil company, brought negotiations with foreign 
oil companies to an impasse as he fought for much better profit-sharing and operational 
terms.23)  Interestingly, the Indonesian technocrats’ externally lauded platform of “strong 
state and free market,” comparative advantage and free trade was internally challenged 
by a group of “engineers”—a sort of “Bandung Institute of Technology Mafia”—who 
advocated the economic-nationalist use of industrial policy, and state nurture and protec-
tion from external competition to develop domestic industries.  The rivalry between 
technocrats and engineers—the latter being oddly disqualified from being titled techno-
crats24)—for the support of their common patron, Soeharto, rendered Indonesia’s develop-
ment somewhat schizoid, “oscillat[ing] between the two strategies”: in good times, eco-
nomic nationalism led to large-scale, capital-intensive but often wasteful and debt-laden 
state projects; in a bust, the regime shelved those projects, devalued the rupiah, and 
resorted to deregulation to integrate the economy more deeply with the global market 
(Shiraishi in this volume).
In post-authoritarian but pre-1997 crisis South Korea, the technocracy of the finance 
and economic ministries clashed with “liberal economists who dominate[d] the research 
institutes” over the pace of financial liberalization.25)  The liberal economists, intellectu-
ally leading an emergent ruling coalition, pressed for “a sudden acceleration of liberali-
zation.”  The technocrats, “the voice of prudent caution, resisting pressure for too rapid 
23) A glowing but incomplete account of Razaleigh’s eventual success in obtaining better terms than 
those initially offered by the foreign oil companies is given in Gill (1987, 132–143).  In the event, 
Razaleigh lost his position (Jesudason 1989).
24) Unless it was because “with their economic bias, the engineers tend to exude the type of entrepre-
neurial government reminiscent of Sutowo” (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 16, 1980, 44, cited 
in Milne [1982, 407]), that is, an advocate (whatever his failings) of an interventionist state that 
would compete with or control private enterprise.  Compare this with the note that in Chile the 
“neo-liberal model of development . . . meant the end of the entrepreneur state and the establish-
ment of the market as the principal mechanism for the allocation of resources” (Huneeus 2000, 471).
25) Referring to this policy conflict, Gills (1996, 680) presciently observed, on the basis of “salutary 
lessons of some Latin American cases in the 1970s and 1980s, and of Russia,” that, “Financial lib-
eralization is clearly the most potentially dangerous or economically disruptive process of acceler-
ated opening.”
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opening of the financial sector,” was “more skeptical, partly out of principle and partly 
out of a perceived challenge to technocratic management powers” (Gills 1996, 672, 681, 
683).  Ironically, when rapid financial liberalization, among other things, led to the collapse 
of the South Korean won in late 1997, the IMF, a leading opponent of East Asian “finan-
cial repression,” would project itself as an enlightened technocracy that would set an 
errant South Korean state right (Hall 2003).  However, in Singapore, which had weath-
ered the 1997 crisis rather well, technocrats who manage the state’s massive financial 
assets have had to fend off criticisms by domestic and global market competitors and 
investors who urged higher degrees of transparency and disclosure from the technocrat-
managed government-linked corporations (Rodan 2004, 483).
In retrospect, it mattered significantly when or how technocrats emerged, during 
rapid growth and major social transformation, or at moments of severe crisis and exter-
nally imposed adjustment.  Comparing the quality of technocracy in four African nations, 
Bangura (1994, 52) broadly suggests that “sustained growth enables the state to nurture 
a technocratic class” having “solid bonds . . . to the state apparatus and the principal 
institutions from which technocrats are recruited.”  “Profound crisis and tough pro-
grammes of economic reform,” however, can lead to “de-professionalization” so that 
while “multilateral funding agencies . . . export their expertise and shape the agenda of 
change,” working with what local experts can be recruited, the resultant technocracy is 
“fraught with problems since the institutional settings from which it springs are in crisis” 
and its reproduction “at the same level of quality . . . becomes a difficult problem in the 
long-run” (ibid., 52–53).
One can appreciate Bangura’s insight against the high-quality East Asian technocra-
cies’ record of directing relatively autonomous and highly rewarding paths of development 
via state-led late industrialization.  In Japan and the East Asian newly- industrializing 
economies, technocrats wielded a firm hand in transforming their economies.  They used 
industrial policy in its many manifestations: promoting strategic industries, nurturing 
select corporations, allocating resources preferentially, maintaining different methods of 
protectionism, and periodically rationalizing the structures of important sectors.  The 
East Asian technocracies by no means made their economic history free from crisis. 
Japan’s unconditional surrender and military occupation, South Korea’s wartime destruc-
tion, the Taiwanese regime’s retreat from a lost civil war, and Singapore’s risky secession 
from Malaysia were not circumstances the respective technocrats could have chosen. 
Nor were their regimes exemplars of liberal democracy: three out of four of them were 
authoritarian and two of those were military dictatorships for long periods.  Yet, driven 
by economic nationalism, diligently “governing the market,” and operating with high 
state capacities, the technocracies pushed their programs of industrialization and struc-
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tural transformation to competitive global-scale progress in a range of import- substituting 
and export-oriented industries.
The “East Asian experience” showed that technocracy’s efficacy or achievement 
could not be a matter of using, patronizing, or even insulating technocrats alone.  The 
policy-making role and contributions of technocracy were bound to the ways states organ-
ized and managed their structures of political economy, including institutions, centers 
of power, markets, and relations with the global economy.  The authoritarian Northeast 
Asian states that pursued late industrialization within a short period, for instance, would 
pick and subsidize their favored “winners” but would require of the latter outstanding 
performance, both the support and the discipline being elements of a coherent strategy 
of economic development targeting rapid growth, industrial advance, and market com-
petitiveness.  Designing and implementing such agendas, technocracy could make its 
efficacy, even its self-interest, an integral part of a project of economic nationalism vis-
à-vis an ever-possible foreign domination.
Such a narrative of East Asian industrial success is too well rehearsed to bear further 
recounting here.26)  Suffice it to add that if the East Asian technocrats began in crisis, they 
progressed to growth, reproducing themselves into the bargain.  They were nurtured in 
select educational institutions, recruited via elitist methods, cohesively organized in 
strong agencies and ministries, bonded to well-defined policy agendas, insulated from 
popular pressures by strong regimes for long periods, and empowered by diverse forms 
of legal, bureaucratic, and political support.27)  The process of technocratic reproduction 
26) For a few authoritative accounts, see Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Rodan (1989), and Wade 
(1990).
27) In instructive contrast, from Bangura (1994, 46): “The Nigerian technocracy arose out of a deep 
socio-economic crisis and a far reaching process of economic and political restructuring.  It is 
recruited informally through a variety of ways, the principal ones being contacts with military offi-
cers, business elites, politicians, top bureaucrats, and ethnic pressure groups, and visibility in pro-
fessional organizations and public debates.  It is a fairly large group, with considerable input from 
academics.  Except for the early formulation of the economic reform program, which required some 
level of foreign input, the group has a solid indigenous base, oil revenues having played a role in 
creating a large pool of trained academics, bureaucrats, and professionals.  Given the nature of its 
recruitment and its contradictory interests and orientations, it has not developed any consistently 
clear set of ideas that have remained dominant for any considerable period, except in certain areas 
of economic reform where neoliberalism has been forced upon the policy makers by the multilateral 
funding agencies and creditors.  It has not been a very stable force, given the constant changes in 
policy, rules and personnel by the political leadership.  This instability derives partly from the pres-
sures exerted by a very open civil society, which provides a fertile environment for the regime’s 
manipulation of the political process, exacerbating the problem of creating a closed and predictable 
administrative system for the technocrats.  Despite the inputs made into many aspects of public 
policy, the Nigerian technocrat remains largely ineffective in terms of influencing key outcomes 
and the general direction of change.”
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possibly went furthest where it could be most fully controlled, namely, in the small state 
of Singapore where the boundaries between ruling-party politicians and senior state 
technocrats were blurred in the making of “a self-conscious, self-righteous class of 
 talented and brilliant people with strong character, who are imbued with a collective sense 
of purpose and a consciously collective understanding of the thinking of the group” (Barr 
2006, 6).  Advancing their way to a “miracle,” against the grain of international economic 
orthodoxy, these technocrats reached what was probably technocracy’s pinnacle, at any 
rate outside the western developed states.
Without idealizing Northeast Asia (and allowing for Singapore to be part of it in all 
but geography), it is instructive to contrast it with Southeast Asia to see how the char-
acter of actually functioning technocracy, in relation to its ideal, can be malformed or 
deformed within the framework of political economy.  The position and potential of the 
technocracies of pre-1997 crisis Southeast Asia were curtailed by regimes that mimicked 
the “Japanese model,” the “South Korean model,” or the “Taiwanese model.”  The 
Southeast Asian regimes, insulated from popular pressure, from foreign direct invest-
ment, and, it might be said, from technocracy itself, turned large sectors of the economy 
into oligarchic preserves.  What could technocracy, implying rational policy- and decision-
making based on the rule of law and “good governance,” achieve against the organized, 
state-managed, predatory, or rent-seeking conduct of Marcos’s family and the Filipino 
tycoons, Soeharto’s children and the Indonesian cukong, Mahathir’s coalitions of 
“Umnoputras” and cronies, and the “Bangkok big business” of Thailand?
Senior technocrats were responsible for maintaining macro-economic stability. 
 Perhaps they baulked at the misdeeds of the powerful.  Perhaps they urged “good eco-
nomics” against “bad politics.”  By the overall record, however, technocracy often labored 
as the instrument of nothing nobler than a “contractocracy.”28)  For example, privatization 
was where technocrats might have excelled as makers of policy, setters of governance 
standards, and enforcers of rule compliance.  Yet, as privatization accelerated, technocrats 
were shunted aside by political considerations.  Leigh (1992, 120–121) noted that linkages 
between key individuals in the business and political elites “placed state regulators on 
the defensive . . . simply and effectively bypassed,” while institutionalized checks on 
regulatory power “suited the ‘oligarchs’ in the Philippines and the ‘timber tycoons’ of 
Malaysia.”  By the late 1990s, Malaysia’s privatization had much in common with Indo-
nesia’s where a “huge range of former public monopolies in oil distribution and contract-
28) “. . . the oligarchy collaborated with southern business elites, bureaucrats and transnationals though 
the corrupt National Party of Nigeria, to turn the country into a ‘Contractocracy”’ (Bangura 1994, 
27).
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ing, power generation, telecommunications, toll road and port construction and opera-
tion were now passed, usually without tender, into the hands of the major oligarchs” 
(Robison 2004, 409).29)  And when the Thai political system was transformed, businesses 
“could no longer deal primarily with bureaucrats and technocrats, but had to negotiate 
deals with frequently-changing ministers in a series of governments” (McCargo and 
Ukrist 2005, 25).
Techno-Political Fusion
The politics of technocracy’s relationship to development goes deeper.  Referring to the 
South Korean technocracy’s caution in opening and liberalizing their financial sector, 
Gills (1996, 683) contended that
Beyond the self-interest of the technocrats . . . there is the issue of the “right to development,” 
even if via some of the old methods of protection and state guidance.  What was precisely so 
remarkable about the “strong state” NICs was they succeeded in industrializing and creating 
national capital and wealth in the Third World.
Beyond the “right to development,” however, the accumulating evidence—from Japan 
and the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East Asia, to China and “Rhineland 
capitalism”—is clear:
for most countries, and certainly most “latecomers” to industrialization, national success in the 
global marketplace depends on coherent long-term strategic action by state, and the construction 
and maintenance of a dense web of “intermediate” institutions (banks, financial and technical 
services, training, and infrastructure of all kinds) that the market needs but does not provide. (Leys 
1996, 195)
In the post-war, Keynesian, pro-development milieu that supported “long-term strategic 
action by the state,” the “web of intermediate institutions” would be the realm of tech-
nocrats of many kinds.  Then and there, technocracy would not just pick up the pieces of 
shattered government but deploy its “human resources” as a critical element of com-
petitive advantage.  Since the 1970s, however, neoliberal globalization had steadily whit-
tled the path of relatively autonomous state-led, technocracy-implemented development 
so that:
29) For an excellent study of the political and economic sources of the failure of four major privatization 
projects in Malaysia, which symbolized the failure of Mahathir’s privatization as a whole, see Tan 
(2008).
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The era of national economies and national economic strategies is past—for the time being, at least. 
With capital free to move where it wishes, no state (and least of all a small poor one) can pursue 
any economic policy that the owners of capital seriously dislike. . . . It is hardly too much to say 
that by the end of the 1980s the only development policy that was officially approved was not to 
have one—to leave it to the market to allocate resources, not the state. (ibid., 23–24)
“In the World Bank’s own ingenuous language,” adds Leys (ibid., 24), “new ideas stress 
prices as signals; trade and competition as links to technical progress; and effective 
government as a scarce resource, to be employed sparingly and only where most needed.” 
And for most nations, to use Andre Gunder Frank’s language, “Now neo-liberalism, post-
Keynesianism and neo-structuralism have . . . become totally irrelevant and bankrupt for 
development policy.  In the real world, the order of the day has become only economic 
or debt crisis management” (cited in ibid.).
After the 1997 financial crisis, the neoliberal agendas that IMF’s intervention 
imposed via the extant regimes met with oligarchic resistance coupled with popular 
opposition.  As it happened, debt management, structural adjustment, and deeper integra-
tion with the global system did not replace “crony capitalism” with the orderly self-
regulating markets envisioned by neoliberalism.  Almost exactly the feared opposites 
happened.  Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai’s part-nationalist, part-oligarchic, 
and part-populist movement remade Thai politics only to create untidy scenes of half-
hearted policy reforms, incomplete agendas, and recurring political turmoil (Kasian 2006; 
Glassman 2004; Pasuk and Baker 2004).  Of the institutionalization of a “vast system of 
benefices and rents” in post-Soeharto Indonesia that defined the state’s relationships 
with capitalists, cronies, and “fixers,” it has been said that
[t]his was not a world where “rational” technocrats simply negotiated their way through the con-
straints of powerful interests, both within and outside the state.  This was a vast and crudely 
instrumental system of state power where public authority and private interest were fused and 
where state capitalism gave way to the rise of politico-business oligarchies emerging from within 
the state itself. (Robison and Hadiz 2004, 30)
These developments showed how ineffectual was the beneficent impact of technoc-
racy on political economy in times of crises, precisely when, it was always thought, 
technocracy would best fulfill its role.  Still, such developments are far from being the 
precursors of any “end of technocracy.”  If anything, they seem uncannily to bring matters 
back to the politics of the “technocratic model of modernization,” albeit in different guises. 
For China, it has been hoped that “reformists” and “leftists” who had fought each other 
would be swept aside by “a third force of market-friendly authoritarian technocrats” 
whose “post-totalitarian technocratic authoritarianism,” “pragmatic authoritarianism,” 
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“political authoritarianism,” or “limited authoritarianism,” however one wants to call it, 
evidently represents a gradual movement towards a “democratic idea [that] has just 
appeared on the horizon” (Xiao 2003, 61–65).  For other important reasons, too, techno-
crats may ironically be more needed than ever before:
in a world where the liberal notion of a progressive and autonomous civil society becomes a threat 
to markets, neoliberals were drawn to the idea of “change teams” or “technopols” able to stand 
above the clash of vested interests and rent-seekers and to impose collective welfare benefits of 
markets on society.  Neoliberal agendas clearly required a political formulation in which these 
technocratic policy-makers might be insulated from the raids of predatory interests. (Robison 
2004, 415)
Perhaps closest to this scenario of a neoliberal, market-fundamentalist world where 
technocrats stood above venal interests was a political trend that washed over Latin 
America during the 1990s.  Here and now, technocracy and politics met, or were encour-
aged to meet, so that not old and insulated technocrats but new and politically blooded 
“technopols” would arise to bear the task of “freeing markets and politics” (Domínguez 
1997).  As Centeno showed of the Mexican tecnócratas led by Carlos Salinas, a “hybrid” 
elite had triumphed who seemed ideally to combine the educational credentials of the 
técnicos with the political access and acumen of the politicos (Centeno 1994, 106).  Their 
program of salinastroika meant joining the “global revolution of the market” within which 
the states of the developing world “reduced public subsidies, competed for links with the 
developed economies and investment capital from multinationals, and sought to prove 
their ‘fiscal responsibility”’ (ibid., 21).  In plain and hard-nosed terms,
[c]ountries that play the game dictated by either creditors or other potential sources of capital are 
rewarded with investments or new loans.  Exporters of primary materials may find that the inter-
national markets are only open to those producers that respect a certain set of rules.  In the most 
extreme interpretations of this situation, reforming governments have lost their autonomy over 
economic policy and must follow the dictates of external powers.  But even in less dramatic cases 
the promise of extra capital or the threat of curtailment has an obvious effect on government deci-
sions. (ibid., 22)
There appears to be nothing new under the technocratic sun after all.  It has been 
technocracy’s game to manage that envisioned national-global interface over and over 
again in a relatively long trajectory that took technocracy into orthodox development, 
crisis intermediation, debt management, structural adjustment, and neoliberal marketiza-
tion.  If such is the situation in which the technocratic ideal finds its culmination, it must 
do so in a severely truncated form.
Technocracy and Politics in a Trajectory of Conflict 435
There is no doubt that technocracy exerts a persistent appeal: when all is said and done, 
who would not want to replace a “strong and demagogic discourse used in the past” with 
a “technocratic approach” that promised “rational solutions” to social and economic 
 problems (Silva 1991, 410)?  Yet any technocratic separation of the economic from the 
political was likely to be false.  Even the “Chicago Boys” were only a subset of the 
 “ODEPLAN Boys” who formed the economic twin to the “Gremialists” whose political 
project to entrench authoritarian rule was no less important to Pinochet’s regime than 
neoliberal economic restructuring (Huneeus 2000).  There was never an intention to 
separate economics from politics for all the talk of insulating “good economics” from “bad 
politics.”  Thus, in mid-1980s’ Chile, “paradoxically, the opposition to authoritarian rule 
also adopted an increasingly technocratic character” whereby the “CIEPLAN Monks” 
(an influential group of technocrats in the democratic government) vouchsafed their 
professional credentials in reply to the presumed technical superiority of the Chicago 
Boys (Silva 1991, 386, and fn. 3).  And to a smaller degree, such a form of the techno-
cratization of politics can be present, too, in Malaysia where Anwar Ibrahim leads a 
nascent opposition coalition that proffers a new economic agenda, one that is not sullied 
by cronyism, but supposedly strengthened with technocratic competence and profes-
sionalism.30)
Beyond that, it seems premature to think that the technocrats, technopols and 
 tecnócratas have triumphed.  For several years now in Latin America, political movements 
that bring together assertive indigenism, radical populism, and resurgent regionalism 
have haunted neoliberalism.  In one country after the next, “the strong populist and 
demagogic discourse used in the past” has reasserted itself in renewed demands for social 
equity and justice, indigenous rights and re-nationalization, and the construction of 
regionalism and regional solidarity:
A string of New Left governments has emerged beginning with Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1999 
followed by Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva in Brazil in 2003.  They have been joined by the election of 
left of center presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
El Salvador. (Burbach 2009)
From that view, a “Bolivarian tide” threatens to topple technocratization from its 
imagined height.  Whether or not it succeeds, its points are clear: politics and technocracy 
30) Among the features of the technocratization of Chilean politics, according to Silva (1991), was the 
growth of private research institutes which supplied a counter-technocratic response to the regimes. 
Recently, in Malaysia, research institutes not linked to state-sponsored think tanks have begun to 
offer professional and technocratic critiques and counter-proposals to state policies.
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remain each other’s bane since the one cannot insulate the other, not for long, not ulti-
mately.  There may just have to be another game in town!
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